By: Lavya Bhasin
INTRODUCTION
Section 359 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter “BNSS”) discusses compounding of offences, wherein on one hand, section 359(1) has a table of offences that can be compounded without permission of the court, and section 359(2) has a table of offences that can only be compounded with the permission of the court. On the other hand, section 359(9) states that “no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section.” The legislative intent behind the same is to not allow the court to compound serious offences which have a grave societal impact.
However, despite the presence of this section, even proceedings of offences which cannot be compounded are sometimes quashed by High Courts (hereinafter “HC”) in exercise of inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS. These powers allow HCs to make orders which are necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. I aim to bring to light the question of how something which is barred by definition (and provision of law) is being done by means of judicial intervention.
I will ultimately demonstrate that the reasoning by the Supreme Court (hereinafter, “SC”) in various judgments, while allowing exercise of power to, if not compound the offence, quash the proceedings; in order to reach the same consequence of acquittal, is inconsistent and suffers from a lack of clarity. I will do this by means of an analysis of recent landmark judgments of the SC, which can be grouped into three sets, with three different, or rather mutually-inconsistent stances about the use of inherent powers of the HCs to quash proceedings of a non-compoundable offence. This blog does not aim to dispute or support the use of inherent powers per se, but only aims to bring the inconsistency in the reasoning of the SC while allowing/ refusing the use of the same.
CONFUSED STANCES OF THE SUPREME COURT – THE THREE SETS OF
(i) Set I: Use Of Inherent Powers To Quash Proceedings Of A Non-Compoundable Offence Viewed As Backdoor Entry
These are judgments where the SC has taken the view that proceedings of a non-compoundable offence must not be quashed using inherent powers, since something that cannot be done directly must also not be done indirectly, thereby viewing the use of inherent powers as a backdoor entry into compounding a non-compoundable offence.
In the case of CBI v Sadhu Ram Singla, the issue was whether proceedings alleging non-compoundable offences could be quashed by the HC in exercise of inherent powers on the basis of the settlement between the parties. In answering this, the ratio decidendi of this case relied on Manoj Sharma v State, which stated that no court can be justified in doing something indirectly that cannot be done directly, and therefore cannot quash the proceedings in a non-compoundable offence, which has expressly been prohibited by the legislature. The court in paragraph 13 stated that the doctrine of Judicial Restraint does not allow the judiciary to encroach into another organ, i.e., the legislature, as that would be a tantamount violation of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. It seems that the court is of the view that even inherent powers of the HC are subject to legislative bars, and that Section 359(9) has no room for judicial action whatsoever. Therefore, even Section 528 cannot be used to permeate the same.
However, it must be noted that in Sadhu Ram Singla, the court has not explained why it has chosen to rely on Manoj Sharma and discard the other precedents cited and even taken on record, such as CBI v Ravishankar Prasad and Gian Singh v State of Punjab, which take an opposing view, and state that the power to do complete justice by means of section 528 “cannot be whittled down by any embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) CrPC (now Section 359(9) BNSS) or any other curtailment”.
(ii) Set II: Inherent Powers and Compounding Powers Viewed as ‘Different’ From One Another
Arun Singh v State of UP asks the question expressly, as to whether quashing proceedings of a non-compoundable offence is akin to compounding the offence indirectly. The court in para 12 states, “We do not think so. There does exist a distinction between compounding an offence under section 320 and quashing it in exercise of Section 482 (now Section 528 of the BNSS). These two powers are different, although the consequence is the same, that is, acquittal.” This case, therefore, allowed quashment of proceedings.
However, even though this case came after Sadhu Ram Singla, it surprisingly did not differ from the reasoning therein. Further, it did not explain the consequence of these two powers being ‘different’ from one another, and whether different means superior. The court should have explained whether inherent powers can override an express legislative bar by virtue of being different. As of now, there is a lack of clarity as to whether inherent powers are meant to bridge certain gaps to ensure justice, or whether they can even do something unimagined, or rather, something expressly prohibited by the legislature in some other provision.
Very similar lines of thought as Arun Singh also occur in Gian Singh (as mentioned above), and in Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, where the court says in paragraph 16.1 that “Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the HC to secure ends of justice, and it does not confer any new powers, but only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the HC.” In paragraph 16.2 it states that “the use of jurisdiction in compounding and quashing is different, and the power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable”. This viewpoint showcases a stark contrast to the judgments mentioned above, which endorse that a strict legislative bar calls for judicial restraint even on the exercise of inherent powers.
(Lavya Bhasin is a law undergraduate at the National Law Institute University, Bhopal. The author may be contacted via mail at lavyabhasin.bscllb@nliu.ac.in)
Cite as: Lavya Bhasin, Judicial Intervention in Compounding of Non-Compoundable Offences: ‘Inherent’ or ‘Indirect’ Power? (Part 1), 25th November 2025 <https://rmlnlulawreview.com/2025/11/25/judicial-intervention-in-compounding-of-non-compoundable-offences-inherent-or-indirect-power-part-1/> date of access.
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