India struggles with white-collar crimes that drain billions, wreck trust, and threaten jobs. Scandals like Satyam in 2009 and Punjab National Bank in 2018 show the damage which amount to 2-3% of GDP yearly and shaken markets. Courts, clogged with over 5 crore cases, can’t keep up, making traditional prosecutions slow and weak. This paper proposes Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) to solve this problem allowing companies admit their wrongs, pay penalties, and fix their ways to skip full trials. Using game theory, we craft a Hybrid DPA Framework tailored for India. We picture regulators and companies as players in a game where both can win. Regulators can offer deals or push for trials, while companies can come clean or hide their misdeeds, cooperation scores highest at 8.0, while fighting scores a measly 2.0. Nash equilibrium reveals why firms might dodge truth without DPAs, but fair deals, backed by ideas like Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining, nudge them toward working together. Kaldor-Hicks logic proves DPAs help society by saving jobs while punishing wrongdoers. Using all of this analysis, we built our framework on six ideas namely stopping crime, encouraging honesty, protecting workers and investors, ensuring accountability, fitting diverse firms, and being open with the public. We draw on 24 global cases, like Siemens’ 2008 deal, HSBC’s 2012 agreement and other relevant cases. Lastly, we suggest a new way to ensure payments to victims and public tracking to rebuild trust. The model simplifies some payoffs and assumes rational players, which might miss local issues like corruption. This work puts up a strong case for ensuring deferred prosecution agreements in India and uses game theory as an analytical tool to cut through the noise and flow towards the signal of white-collar crimes. Continue reading Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A Game-Theoretic Solution To India’s White Collar Crisis