By: Debarchita Pradhan
INTRODUCTION
Although a legislation may be introduced with good intentions, faulty drafting can lead to serious consequences. This can be observed in the case of the hasty deletion of the doctrine of pious obligation by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). While Section 6(4) calls for the abolition of this doctrine, the proviso to the same creates some ambiguities. These ambiguities were resolved by the Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma and Ors. However, rather than a solution, the resolution created further prejudice against the interests of daughters. This piece aims to demonstrate how the interpretation of Section 6(4) by the court is incorrect, keeping in mind the purpose of the legislature and highlights some of the severe implications that may arise from such an interpretation.
I: INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 6(4) IN VINEETA SHARMA CASE
[A] Deviating a Provision from its Purpose
Any ambiguity in the text of a provision may lead to severe repercussions. If the court restricts itself to the meaning obtained by a mere technical interpretation of such provision, it will defeat the purpose for which the legislature brought the provision in the first place. This was the unfortunate result of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma and Ors. The court, in this case, rightly concluded that according to the retroactive application of Section 6(1) of the Act, a daughter is a coparcener by birth. However, such retroactive application was stretched to the point that it also ruled that under the proviso to Section 6(4), the daughter is liable in the same manner as the son to pay the debts of her father that were contracted before the commencement of the Act. Such an interpretation of the statute defeats its purpose.
According to the rule of interpretation of statutes, the true meaning of an enactment can be determined from the intention of the legislature, which can be inferred from the mischief that the legislature wanted to cure by bringing the enactment and hence, the purpose behind the same. If one refers to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, it would be clear that the legislature wanted to remove the discrimination by giving equal “rights” to the daughters in the Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property. This was a right-enabling legislation. Rather than imposing equal liabilities as that of the son, there is greater emphasis on providing equal rights to the daughter. Hence, it cannot be said that the legislature intended to burden the daughters with the liability of pious obligation for the debts incurred before this amendment. While proposing to bring the daughters to an equal position with that of the sons, it was pointing to the rights that flow from the title of coparcenary.
Moreover, this amendment was based on the recommendations in the 174th Report of the Law Commission of India. In this report, the Law Commission recommended a total abrogation of the doctrine of pious obligation. Hence, both the Law Commission and the legislature that brought the amendment based on its recommendation could not have intended to abolish pious obligation and introduce pious obligation on the daughters at the same time.
[B] Possibility of Two Interpretations
At the same time, it is important to note that the court should not be wholly blamed for misconstruing Section 6(4) of the Act in the Vineeta Sharma case. It relied upon Section 6(2) of the Act to conclude that daughters being entitled to a right to property under Section 6(1), they would also be bound to follow the “rigours of coparcenary”. This seems to be inferred from the term “incidents of coparcenary” under Section 6(2). Moreover, Section 6(1)(c) says that the daughter of a coparcener shall “be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son.” So, on a combined reading of both these provisions, it seems that, the daughter would hold the property with all the incidents of coparcenary ownership which includes the liabilities envisaged under Section 6(1)(c). Hence, it follows that such liability includes the payment under the doctrine of pious obligation for the debts incurred before the abolishment of this doctrine as per the proviso under Section 6(4).
However, this reasoning is not fully convincing in light of the language adopted in the proviso to Section 6(4). Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 6(4) secures the right of the creditor to proceed against the “son, grandson, or great-grandson”. It does not mention the daughter under this clause. It may be argued, firstly, that if the daughters are provided with all rights with respect to such coparcenary property, they should also be liable to take an equal burden as that of sons under the doctrine of pious obligation. However, this may go against the meaning of pious obligation as per the religious connotations attached to this doctrine. Such obligation was imposed on the sons and not the daughters. In fact, sons were desired to fulfil such an obligation by paying the debts of their father. Secondly, it may also be argued, that the imposition of liability under proviso to Section 6(4) exclusively on sons would result in discrimination against them. However, to cure such discrimination, the legislature chose to abolish the whole doctrine itself instead of imposing it equally on sons and daughters.
So, two possible interpretations exist due to the lack of clarity in the Act regarding the position and liabilities of daughters under Section 6(4) proviso. When such a case arises where the statute is open to more than one interpretation, the Court should choose the interpretation that gives effect to the true intention of the legislature. Hence, the Court in the Vineeta Sharma case should have chosen the second interpretation in light of the intention of the legislature which can be inferred from the language adopted under Section 6(4) of the Act and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act. Nevertheless, the legislature should clarify the incongruency visible in Section 6(1)(c) and Section 6(2) on one hand and the language of Section 6(4) on the other.
(Debarchita Pradhan is a law undergraduate at National Law School of India University (NLSIU), Bangalore. The author may be contacted via mail at debarchita.pradhan@nls.ac.in)
Cite as: Debarchita Pradhan, The Fallout of Hasty Deletion of Pious Obligation in Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma & Ors (Part 1), 10th October 2024 <https://rmlnlulawreview.com/2024/10/10/the-fallout-of-hasty-deletion-of-pious-obligation-in-vineeta-sharma-v-rakesh-sharma-ors-part-1/> date of access.
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