Capture, Control, and Consequences: Trump’s Venezuela Strike Through the Lens of International Law

By: Kanishk Goyal and Naavya Dixit


BRIEF BACKGROUND

On 03 January 2026, the United States (hereinafter, ‘U.S.’). President Donald Trump stated that the U.S. had carried out a military operation in Venezuela and captured its President, Nicolás Maduro, along with his wife, Cilia Flores. This goes beyond a political dispute and strikes at the core of international law. It raises urgent questions about the prohibition on the use of force, respect for sovereignty, and the limits of self-defence in an era where criminal indictments and security claims are increasingly invoked to justify military action. Such actions pose a serious challenge to international law while also exposing a deeper truth that the stability of the legal order depends on the willingness of major powers. In a fragile global order, this incident is vital to test whether international law still effectively deters.

The announcement was concerning not merely because it involved the arrest of a foreign head of state, but because it followed months of escalating military and economic pressure. Since September 2025, U.S. forces have carried out multiple strikes on alleged drug-smuggling Venezuelan boats, resulting in more than 100 reported deaths. These actions laid the groundwork for what President Trump later described as a decisive intervention.

Even more pertinently, Trump went further and claimed that the U.S. would assume interim governance of Venezuela and that the U.S. would temporarily run Venezuela until a “safe, proper and judicious transition of power” could be achieved. He added that U.S. oil companies would enter the country, repair damaged infrastructure, and restart oil production. This assertion elevated the action from a claimed law-enforcement operation to one involving direct control over a sovereign state.

The authors first focus on the factual context of this operation, followed by a legal analysis with reference to sovereignty, use of force, and head of state immunity, and conclude by assessing the impact on the international legal order.

WHY VENEZUELA AND WHY NOW

Trump has repeatedly accused President Maduro of being a senior member of a drug trafficking network- Cartel de los Soles. He claims that the cartel is responsible for trafficking large quantities of drugs into the U.S. These allegations form the basis of multiple U.S. indictments, including charges of narco-terrorism, cocaine importation conspiracy, and possession of machine guns and destructive devices. However, Trump has not publicly presented detailed evidence to substantiate these claims. Additionally, he has alleged that Venezuela deliberately allowed criminals, gang members, etc., to migrate to the U.S.

Beyond drugs and immigration lies a hidden motive. Venezuela is one of the most resource-rich countries in the world. President Maduro has publicly stated that the country holds mineral wealth worth over $1.3 trillion. Venezuelan officials have previously accused the U.S. of attempting to plunder these resources under the cover of sanctions and security concerns, an accusation reinforced by Trump’s statements regarding U.S. oil companies entering Venezuela.

This incident does not merely concern international relations or politics. As noted by the United Nations (hereinafter, ‘UN’) Secretary-General and several states, the intervention and subsequent capture of the President raise questions across multiple areas of international law, particularly concerning sovereignty, use of force, and external control over natural resources.

WHEN ARREST WARRANTS CROSS BORDERS: SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DEFENCE, AND IMMUNITY

Primarily, the operation violates sovereignty and territorial integrity by contravening the mandate of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, i.e., prohibition on use of force, and Article 2(7), i.e., principle of non-intervention, both of which are also enshrined in the Preamble. The U.S. has itself accepted the customary character of non-use of force. The only two exceptions are: self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter or a sanction from the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter, ‘UNSC’) under Chapter VII. Only where either of these is met can a State successfully establish jus ad bellum (right to war), which is a mandatory threshold for lawful use of force.

The absence of a UNSC sanction in the present incident remains uncontested. What is, however, in question is whether there were adequate grounds for self-defence to be exercised. In this regard, an “armed attack” must have occurred to necessitate such force per Article 51. The International Court of Justice (hereinafter, ‘ICJ’) in Nicaragua v USA opined that an action would be an armed attack if, because of its scale and effects, it could not be classified as a mere border skirmish. Similarly, the Oil Platforms Case further added that an attack must be carried out with the specific intent of harming. Washington has raised multiple allegations, including drug trafficking, narco-terrorism, and arms smuggling; however, these do not constitute an armed attack as articulated above.

Further, the U.S. may attempt to justify the operation in the guise of anticipatory self-defence, wherein a State may use force against an imminent armed attack that is yet to occur. However, this right has been excluded from the scope of Article 51, as can also be seen in the express ruling of the ICJ in DRC v Uganda, and the implied ruling in Nicaragua v USA wherein an armed attack was defined to include only an attack of a certain severity. Regardless, a measure taken should be necessary and proportionate, a condition that is yet again not met.

Another foundational principle of international law, violated by the U.S., is the principle of head-of-state immunity. Washington asserts that Maduro is an unrecognised head– an argument which may lead to the application of the unwilling or unable doctrine (hereinafter, ‘UUD’), justifying the use of force by another State against non-state actors (hereinafter, ‘NSA’) upon the unwillingness or inability of the host State to take necessary action. However, this doctrine is highly contentious. It gives individual States unbridled discretion to take action without following the statutory scheme of Chapter VII. This is a clear attempt to bypass the UN framework. Even if one must argue in favour of upholding UUD, some safeguards must be put in place. For instance, the effects doctrine, requiring sufficient territorial nexus, can be used as a threshold to invoke UUD.

Pertinently, even the UUD applies only to actions against NSAs. Mere non-recognition of Maduro by the U.S. does not convert a sitting President into an NSA. Even otherwise, as seen in DRC v Uganda and Nicaragua, effective control of the State must be established over NSAs to constitute legitimate action against the State itself (Venezuela in the present conflict), which has not been established. Washington has also conveniently recognised the Vice President of Venezuela, who holds the office under a similar framework to Maduro, while refusing to recognise Maduro as the Head. Such contradictions, per the U.S.’s convenience, pose a threat to the stability of the international framework.

The U.S. has failed to respect the immunity recognised under Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and under customary law, also known as rationae personae or personal immunity. Supporters argue that Trump acted within his constitutional powers and executed a valid arrest warrant. However, such arguments explicitly contradict settled law. ICJ in Congo v Belgium has recognised this while ruling that both official and private acts are covered, whether committed before or during such a position in office. The Court further noted that there exists no exception that allows another State’s domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over an official person unless the immunity is waived by the host State. This reinforces the strong stance of international law and, therefore, convenient arguments regarding unilateral non-recognition undermine the settled framework of international law and lack a strong legal basis.

SOVEREIGNTY ON TRIAL: LAW, POWER, AND WHAT COMES NEXT

Despite these grave violations, accountability is unlikely. The weakness of enforcement mechanisms, especially when powerful states are involved, remains a persistent flaw. Interestingly, the two most heavily relied upon cases for use of force- Nicaragua and Oil Platforms– both involve the U.S., but with no participation in the former case’s proceedings, let alone any reparations being made despite the ICJ’s orders. Regrettably, these are two of many such incidents (General Manuel Noriega in Panama, Juan Orlando Hernández in Honduras, etc.) of unlawful intervention by the U.S. forces over time, with little to no legal accountability.

History shows that external interventions often aggravate instability rather than resolve it. It is unclear whether Trump’s bold statements indicate a foreign interim government or more commercial control. Regardless, this operation was merely an opening door with possibly worse to follow. What happens next will shape more than just Venezuela’s political future- if criminal indictments are used to justify military force and temporary control over foreign states, the line between law enforcement and full-fledged war will begin to disappear.

This moment is not only about Maduro or Trump; it is about whether sovereignty still matters, and whether international law governs force or merely reacts after it has already been used. This question is often dismissed by calling international law a “toothless tiger,” especially when powerful states violate even its most basic rules, but this criticism misunderstands how international law works.

It was never designed to function like domestic law, with almost immediate enforcement. Instead, its relevance lies in structure, coordination, and legitimacy. States operate in a deeply interconnected world and cannot afford isolation. Even those that breach international law almost always justify their conduct in its language, precisely because being seen as lawful still matters. This continued reliance on international law as the vocabulary of justification, cooperation, and criticism shows that it is not irrelevant, but indispensable. The real danger is not violation alone, but its open disregard, where power claims to stand above the law. If that attitude spreads, international law weakens not because it lacks force, but because states refuse to play by its rules at all.


(Kanishk Goyal is a second-year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at the National Law Institute University, Bhopal. Naavya Dixit is a fourth-year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at the National Law Institute University, Bhopal. The authors may be contacted via mail at kanishkgoyal.ug@nliu.ac.in and naavyadixit.ballb@nliu.ac.in, respectively.)

Cite as: Kanishk Goyal and Naavya Dixit, Capture, Control, and Consequences: Trump’s Venezuela Strike Through the Lens of International Law, 15th February 2026 <https://rmlnlulawreview.com/2026/02/15/capture-control-and-consequences-trumps-venezuela-strike-through-the-lens-of-international-law/>; date of access.

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