By: Nankee Arora
INTRODUCTION
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter ‘the Code’) was added to the Code by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1923 with the intent to enable High Courts to deliver complete justice. There had been certain cases when there was an ex-facie or even prima facie illegality that was apparent but unresolvable by a provision in the Code resulting in an abuse of the process of the Court, thus warranting a solution for the Court to do complete justice. The powers of this provision enable the Court to secure the ends of justice, prevent abuse of the process of the Court and make any such order that may be necessary to give effect to an order of this Court.
While it may seem that a provision that is meant to ensure complete justice must not bar applications for a technical issue such as limitation period and while the Limitation Act, 1963 does not squarely apply to these applications or any criminal proceedings unless specified in the provision, the High Courts have held on multiple instances that an application under Section 482 (hereinafter ‘482 Application’) cannot be filed with inordinate delay. In light of this information the question arises whether prescribing a limitation period on a 482 Application defeats the purpose for which the provision was inserted. This piece analyses the reasoning of the Court in taking this position to indicate that prohibiting litigants from filing a 482 application with inordinate delay does not dilute the power of the Court to deliver complete justice, instead it strengthens the position of the Court as an efficient forum for justice by upholding the principles of reasonableness, fairness and prudency that are essential to the legal framework of the country.
THE JUDICIAL STANCE ON THE ISSUE
The Bombay High Court recently pronounced a judgement in Sushilabai w/o Vaijinath Pawar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., wherein it held that a 482 Application, while not covered by the Limitation Act, cannot be filed with inordinate delay. The Court held that the time period to file the application must be reasonable and a reasonable time is that which would be required by a prudent litigant faced with similar facts and circumstances to file an application. The reasons for the inordinate delay must be addressed by the Petitioner to the satisfaction of the Court to warrant the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. In taking this position, the Court relied upon the judgement of the Delhi High Court in Vipin Kumar Gupta v. Sarvesh Mahajan, wherein it was held that if the Court failed to take into account inordinate delay and latches before invoking its power under Section 482, there would be no end to the litigation.
A bench of the Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh High Court also passed a similar judgment on the issue in Eapan Chakoo v. UT of J&K. The Bench placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Londhe Prakash Bhagwan v. Dattatraya Eknath Mane which held that if the Statute provides no time limit, then the aggrieved party must approach the competent court within a reasonable time period. It also relied on Rajesh Chetwal v. State where the Delhi High Court opined that since a revision petition challenging an order can be filed within 90 days from the date of the order, the reasonable time period for filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code must also be 90 days. Any petition filed after the period of 90 days, they held, would have to explain the cause of delay.
ANALYSIS
To adjudge why a limitation period is justified on an application under Section 482, the rationale of the Law of Limitation and the spirit of the law on limitation in a criminal context must be analysed. The Law of Limitation, enforced in India through the Limitation Act 1963, serves as a bar on legal actions. By prescribing a period within which an aggrieved must initiate or appeal a legal action in a competent court of law, the Law of Limitation serves as a public policy tool that ensures that the claims of aggrieved individuals are resolved in an expedient manner. Without a law of limitation, as put forth by the Halsbury’s Law of England, there is a threat of an indefinite claim hanging over the defendant’s head that too one for which evidence and memory grows weaker and unascertainable with the passage of time. Moreover, Halsbury also states those with good causes of action should act on them with reasonable diligence and a failure to timely enforce such right must result in a loss of said right. Therefore, the Law of Limitation was enacted with a view that for the Court to provide equitable outcomes and put an end to litigation, the aggrieved party cannot sleep on their rights and must pursue any actionable claim without inordinate delay.
In criminal cases in particular, the Limitation Act does not expressly apply to the Code unless there are specific provisions that provide for it. Chapter XXXVI of the Code, for instance, provides a limitation period for taking cognisance of various offences based on the punishment and gravity of the offence. The idea of prescribing a limitation period for criminal prosecution was recommended in the 42nd Report of the Law Commission of India and considered by the Joint Parliamentary Committee in its report dated 30.11.1972. Weakening of witness testimony and memory over time, dilution of deterrent effect of punishment by inactive prosecution against criminals and continuous apprehension of prosecution for offender were the grounds highlighted in favour of limitation. The proposal for limitation on criminal prosecution, however, directly contradicted with the common law doctrine, Nullum tempus occurrit regi, that is, no time runs against the crown and the lapse of time does not prohibit the State from exercising its right to proceed against offenders. The Apex Court struck a balance between these conflicting positions in Sarah Mathew vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases & Ors. wherein the bench held that the limitation was justified so as to encourage parties not to cause inordinate delay but is a procedural consideration that must be liberally construed and does not lay down a blanket stipulation that complaints must be excluded on the ground of delay alone. This judgement clearly showcases the legal stance of limitation in criminal prosecution, that is encouraging speedy and efficient litigation through limitation while allowing flexibility in said limitation to entertain complaints plagued with justifiable delays to enable justice.
The position taken on limitation with respect to Section 482 Petitions is in a similar vein. The Delhi High Court in Rajesh Chetwal likened a petition under Section 482 to a review petition and stipulated that 90 days would be deemed a reasonable time period or in other words the limitation period. However, at the same time it does not preclude litigants from filing applications or petitions after 90 days, the material difference is that in the latter scenario litigants will be expected to give reasonable cause for their delayed claims to be allowed. Similarly the Bombay High Court also held that inordinate delay can be excused if the litigant can satisfy the cause that it was warranted by a justified cause. Therefore, similar to the limitation under Chapter XXXVI of the Code, while there is a prescribed period within which an aggrieved party is expected to act on an actionable claim, it does exhaust their right to be heard or make a claim or deny the Court an opportunity to do complete justice.
In light of these arguments, it can perhaps be argued that prescribing a limitation period on a petition under Section 482 is not antithetical to the object of the Section, in fact it furthers its object by creating a more efficient justice system. As elaborated above, a limitation period is not conceived with the intention of curtailing the rights of the aggrieved but to ensure that an aggrieved is not sleeping on his rights and exercises them within a reasonable time to ensure that it is adjudicated without the threat of weakening or disappearing evidence and so that the accused is not kept under continuous apprehension of pending litigation. This ensures a timely end to litigation and resolution of possible, disputes which strengthens the justice system’s ability to do complete justice, precisely the object of Section 482 of the Code.
CONCLUSION
While on the face of it curtailing the power of individuals to exercise their legal rights to a limited period of time may appear contrary to the goal of doing complete justice, it is actually an enabler of that object. The end to litigation guaranteed by the Law of Limitation cannot be viewed from the unilateral lens of cost and resource saving but it has to be analysed in the context in which it operates to fully appreciate the efficiency and hence justice it produces by bringing parties to the Court within a reasonable period of time. By balancing such limitations with the opportunity to be heard and explain such delays the High Courts have acted in accordance with the object of Section 482 of the Code by holding that parties may not approach the Court under this Section with inordinate delay.
(Nankee Arora is a law undergraduate at Jindal Global Law School, Sonipat. The author may be contacted via mail at 20jgls-narora@jgu.edu.in20jgls-narora@jgu.edu.in )
Cite as: Nankee Arora, Limitation on S. 482, CrPC Application: An Obstruction to Justice?, 29 October 2023) <https://rmlnlulawreview.com/2023/10/29/limitation-on-s-482-crpc-application-an-obstruction-to-justice/https://rmlnlulawreview.com/2023/10/29/limitation-on-s-482-crpc-application-an-obstruction-to-justice/> date of access.
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