From Right to Dissent to Success of the Resolution Process: Reinforcing Cramdown With Fairness and Equitability
In this article, the authors, explore the “Creditor-Friendly” framework in India, which has met trouble halfway due to a lack of consent over the resolution plans. The two-thirds majority of the CoC that passes a resolution plan disregards the opinions of the dissenting creditors, who get outvoted, and operational creditors, who don’t have voting rights. The minority cannot challenge the commercial wisdom of the Committee but is entitled to fair and equitable distribution under Section 30(2) of the IBC, 2016. Section 30(2) confirms that the operational and the dissenting creditors receive value equivalent to the payment received in the event of liquidation or order of priority. However, its application is shrouded in the mist of confusion regarding the extent of proceeds payable, lowering the success rate of resolution processes. To salvage the creditor-centric resolution process pursued in India, the “cross-class cram down” mechanism may be a relief. An important part of the US insolvency framework, this mechanism has also gained momentum in the UK. It is a bridge binding the dissenting creditors to the resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors. In return, it ensures that the minority is not worse off than the “relevant alternative”. Although Section 30(2) attempts to plant this concept, it has not yet been able to bear the fruits. This article sifts through the application of this concept in different jurisdictions to solve the ambiguities in the Indian Insolvency framework. Continue reading From Right to Dissent to Success of the Resolution Process: Reinforcing Cramdown With Fairness and Equitability
