By: Sri Janani S & Meemansha Choudhary
INTRODUCTION
In a recent order of News Broadcasters Association v. Union of India (hereinafter ‘News Broadcasters Association’), the Supreme Court expressed its apprehensions regarding the penalties that are imposed on the television channels in case of a violation of the Code of Ethics (the instant case was a scenario of media trial). The case came up as an appeal from the Bombay High Court, which denied the statutory character of the News Broadcasters and Digital Association (hereinafter ‘NBDA’). The Apex Court noted that the maximum penalty that could be imposed on the violator is only Rs. 1 lakh, which was last fixed by the NBDA, a self-regulatory body, in 2008 and has not been changed since then. Tracing the penalties to the larger picture of the existing self-regulatory mechanism for T.V. channels, the court deemed the latter to be ineffective and displayed its intention to formulate a comprehensive set of guidelines to reinforce and strengthen the existing mechanism.
In light of the above, this article, firstly, delves deep into the existing self-regulatory mechanism under Rule 18 of the Cable Television Networks (Amendment) Rules, 2021(hereinafter ‘Cable T.V. Network Rules’) and the challenges surrounding multiple regulatory bodies in place. Secondly, the authors examine the distinction between self-regulation and co-regulation, specifically focusing on the recent Broadcasting Bill 2023. Lastly, the authors propose the establishment of a uniform self-regulatory body (hereinafter ‘SRB’) for distinct segments of media. In light of this, the authors contend that there is no dire need for individual broadcasters to set up Content Editorial Committees.
THE EXTENT OF SRB’S JURISDICTION, IN LIGHT OF “MULTIPLE” SRBS
In India, the Cable T.V. Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 was enacted to regulate the operation of cable television networks, in furtherance of which, it passed the Programme Code. In 2011, all the television channels were brought under its purview. No specific regulatory body for television channels exists, like the Press Council of India or the Central Board for Film Certification (CBFC). However, the Cable T.V. Network Rules established a three-tier structure for grievance redressal. Level I involves broadcaster-level grievance redressal, level II involves the SRB of broadcasters, and level III involves an oversight mechanism by the Central Government, like Inter-Ministerial Committee.
Rule 18, establishing level II, reads as “self-regulation by the self-regulating body of broadcasters” and states that there may be one or more self-regulatory bodies of broadcasters, being an independent body of broadcasters or its association. This rule allows for multiple SRBs in place.
The authors argue that, firstly, the provision for numerous SRBs goes against the intention behind the formation of SRBs; i.e., the requirement of some level of uniformity and standardization, as several conflicting bodies exist for the same industry. For instance, NBDA, the Broadcasting Content Complaints Council (BCCC) under the Indian Broadcasting Foundation (IBF), and the News Broadcasting Federation (NBF), amongst other stop-gap mechanisms, govern the news channels. NBDA and BCCC are primarily dominant in the self-regulation of T.V. Channels in India. However, these have a limited scope and focus on one segment, i.e., news broadcasting. Other types of content, such as entertainment or non-news programming, may not be subjected to the scrutiny of such bodies and are left unregulated.
Secondly, the absence of a common industry grouping governing T.V. Channels catering to different segments results in different platforms having their own standards of guidelines and assessments as to what constitutes a violation of code of ethics. No uniform set of content gets moderated. For example, a content may be flagged as media trial by one SRB on one news platform, while it may not be done so on the other. This lack of uniformity further leads to arbitrariness and is antithetical to Article 14 of the Constitution. Multiple regulatory bodies may address similar issues or concerns in one media segment differently, resulting in redundancy and duplication of efforts. This fragmented oversight makes it highly challenging to address such issues.
Thirdly, this can also lead to confusion among the media organizations about which body to approach for guidance or dispute resolution, raising the issue of multiple jurisdictions. Fourthly, multiple SRBs for the same media segment also lead to the issuance of multiple memberships. Undefined criteria for obtaining membership may further lead to a mockery of the nation’s competition standard, where the regulated entities are free to indulge in something similar to forum shopping. If one news channel has multiple memberships, the major problem would be determining the binding value of the codes and directions of each regulatory body on that news channel. The above reasons build a case for the requirement of a uniform SRB for regulating T.V. channels belonging to specific fields like one SRB each for news broadcasting, general entertainment, advertising etc. This would also result in a common code of ethics for each segment.
SELF REGULATION VERSUS CO-REGULATION OF MEDIA: ASSESSING THE FAVORABILITY
‘Co-regulation’ is a French term, that gives a sense of joint responsibility of market actors and the state. It contains elements of self-regulation under the ambit of a legislation i.e., a ‘regulated self-regulatory agency’. This concept can be found in Germany, where the state intervenes when basic constitutional rights are to be upheld. On the other hand, ‘self-regulation’ is entirely voluntary compliance and the legislation plays no role in enforcing relevant standards. It relies on the members’ understanding of ethics and values that underpin their professional conduct. The media voluntarily commits to upholding a code of ethics that it drafts itself and it has a complaints mechanism to deal with the grievances. The courts have no role in enforcing the code of practice.
In India, for instance, a programme code has been laid down under rule 6, which states that no programme should be carried in the cable service, that contains anything amounting to contempt of court. However, this may not be enough to cover situations like media trial, although the consequence of media trial is contempt of court. This is because the contempt of court provision has a very limited scope and primarily addresses only those actions that are brought to the courts’ attention. It may not address the broader issues related to biasness or irresponsible reporting, that may occur in the context of media trials. It can only ‘cure’ the problem but provides for no ‘preventive’ effect. Further, the programme codes will have to be customized and tailored to the needs of every media segment. The current framework, in India, therefore, leans more towards “co-regulation”, with the state playing a crucial role in regulating the media.
This framework is further bolstered through the recent Broadcasting Services (Regulation) Bill, 2023. Section 24 suggests for the formation of a Content Evaluation Committee (hereinafter ‘CECs’) for self-certification, consisting of eminent individuals representing different social groups like women, child welfare, etc. and the composition and quorum of such CECs shall be prescribed by the Central Government. These CECs are established by the individual broadcasters. Further, the Central Government may also prescribe the programmes for which this certification requirement shall not apply. This, in our opinion, represents an extreme form of co-regulation, with the government assuming an intrusive role in press freedom akin to state censorship. Moreover, the imposing CEC mandate on broadcasters places additional financial, administrative and cost burdens. Broadcasters are obligated and compelled to establish and maintain this committee, which is responsible for scrutinizing all content. This process may also instil apprehension among content creators about potential disclosures, further contributing to the overall burden.
An alternative approach would be for the SRB to function similarly, with representation from journalists, media owners or publishers, independent civil society representatives, and other distinguished members of the public, when addressing complaints relating to the violation of code of ethics. This would eliminate the necessity for individual broadcasters to establish CECs, resulting in the creation of an overarching SRB, also functioning as a CEC, for specific media segments.
CONCLUSION
While Rule 18 mandates the establishment of SRBs, this mechanism falls short of effectively dealing with different fields of media in a uniform and coherent manner. Therefore, the authors recommend that there is a compelling need to establish a uniform SRB for each media segment and to consolidate all the existing private regulatory bodies like NBDA, NBF, BCCC, etc., dealing with news channels under it. There must be a conscious collaboration to determine the common content guidelines that would allow for a uniform code of principles to be adopted, thereby resulting in a more streamlined and cohesive regulatory framework.
The term ‘self-regulation’ under Rule 18 is interpreted as ‘co-regulation’ in the Indian context. However, the authors are of the opinion that a co-regulatory mechanism involves a collaborative standard setting and not state censorship, as can be witnessed in the recent Bill. The initiative of the Apex Court in News Broadcasters Association to bring out guidelines in light of the recent Bill is eagerly anticipated.
(Sri Janani S & Meemansha Choudhary are law undergraduate at National Law University, Jodhpur. The authors may be contacted via mail at srijananiseenivasan@gmail.com or meemansha1234@gmail.com)
Cite as: Sri Janani S & Meemansha Choudhary, Deciphering Rule 18 of Cable T.V. Networks (Amendment) Rules: The Enigma of Self-Regulation in T.V. Channels, 22 February 2024, <https://rmlnlulawreview.com/2024/02/22/deciphering-rule-18-of-cable-t-v-networks-amendment-rules-the-enigma-of-self-regulation-in-t-v-channels/>date of access.
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